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+---
+title: "Physician, Heal Thyself: Scanning My Own Dockerfiles with Trivy in Gitea Actions"
+date: 2026-03-03T20:01:00+00:00
+draft: false
+tags: ["cybersecurity", "devops", "docker", "gitops", "homelab", "selfhosted", "infosec", "opensource", "build-in-public", "blue-team", "soc", "devsecops"]
+summary: "I integrated Trivy into my Gitea Actions pipeline to automatically scan 30+ Dockerfiles and Docker Swarm stacks on every push. First finding: my own infrastructure had obvious gaps."
+description: "Hands-on integration of Trivy in Gitea Actions to scan IaC misconfigurations and exposed secrets — no vulnerability database download, running on a 916 MB RAM Lightsail runner."
+author: "Bojemoi"
+ShowToc: true
+ShowReadingTime: true
+---
+
+Physician, heal thyself.
+
+I run an offensive homelab — mass nmap scans, Metasploit exploitation, threat intelligence pipelines. But my own Dockerfiles and Docker Swarm stacks had zero automated security scanning. Not a great look for a security lab.
+
+## Why Trivy?
+
+Trivy is an open-source security scanner from Aqua Security covering multiple attack surfaces: image vulnerabilities, IaC misconfigurations, exposed secrets.
+
+For my use case, two scanners are particularly relevant and require **no vulnerability database download** (~300 MB — too heavy for my 916 MB Lightsail runner):
+
+- `trivy config` — misconfigurations in Dockerfiles and YAML stacks
+- `trivy fs --scanners secret` — hardcoded secrets in the codebase
+
+## The Gitea Actions Integration
+
+The workflow follows the same pattern as my existing Hugo CI/CD: container image + manual `git clone` against the internal Gitea URL.
+
+```yaml
+name: Trivy Security Scan
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+
+jobs:
+  trivy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container:
+      image: aquasec/trivy:latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Clone repo
+        run: |
+          git clone --depth 1 --branch "${GITHUB_REF_NAME:-main}" \
+            "http://oauth2:${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}@gitea:3000/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" /repo
+
+      - name: Scan — misconfigurations
+        run: |
+          trivy config \
+            --severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
+            --exit-code 0 \
+            /repo
+        continue-on-error: true
+
+      - name: Scan — exposed secrets
+        run: |
+          trivy fs \
+            --scanners secret \
+            --exit-code 0 \
+            /repo
+        continue-on-error: true
+```
+
+`--exit-code 0` = advisory mode, no pipeline blocking. Inventory first, harden later.
+
+## Two Bugs Fixed Along the Way
+
+**Bug 1**: The Gitea Act runner automatically mounts a volume at `/workspace/owner/repo`. Cloning to `/workspace` → "not an empty directory". Fix: clone to `/repo` instead.
+
+**Bug 2**: The repo is private. `git clone` without credentials → "could not read Username". Fix: embed `oauth2:${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}` in the URL — the token is automatically injected by Gitea Actions.
+
+## What the First Scan Found
+
+### Misconfigurations (trivy config)
+
+**Running as root (DS-0002 — HIGH)**
+
+Multiple images run as root without an explicit non-privileged user: `berezina`, `borodino`, `narva`, `karacho`... Classic attack surface — if the container is compromised, the attacker gets root directly.
+
+**Secrets in build-args / ENV (CRITICAL)**
+
+`karacho`, `oblast`, and `oblast-1` Dockerfiles pass secrets via environment variables or build-args. These secrets end up baked into image layers and visible in Docker history.
+
+**`apt-get` without `--no-install-recommends` (DS-0029 — HIGH)**
+
+ZAP Dockerfiles (`oblast/Dockerfile.zaproxy`) install packages without `--no-install-recommends`, unnecessarily inflating image size and attack surface.
+
+### Exposed Secrets (trivy fs)
+
+No hardcoded secrets detected. Good news.
+
+## What's Next
+
+The workflow is live. Next steps:
+
+1. Fix critical Dockerfiles (secrets in ENV first)
+2. Add non-root `USER` declarations where feasible
+3. Flip `--exit-code 1` on the secret scanner once false positives are triaged
+4. Extend to `trivy image` to scan built images (requires more RAM)
+
+Security infrastructure starts with its own hygiene.